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Information flows through a global environment characterized by conflict and 
competition. One party wants a flow to occur; another wants to block it. To illustrate: 
users want to freely exchange information, while governments and businesses seek to 
block information harmful to their interests. Spies try to infiltrate the networks of their 
adversaries and competitors to gather intelligence, while their targets employ security 
mechanisms to prevent network exploitation and attack. Hackers and identity thieves 
send e-mails loaded with viruses and other forms of malicious software, while users 
employ anti-viral tools to block the same. 
 
Conflicts over information flow are at the heart of information operations and warfare, to 
include cyber warfare, cyber crime, and cyber conflict in general. One party sends 
packets or streams of information that aim to attack, exploit, or influence a target, while 
the opponent employs measures to stop the flows. The cyber assault against Estonian in 
2007, for example, was launched by patriotic Russian hackers who were incensed by the 
relocation of a Soviet-era war memorial in Estonia’s capital, Tallinn. To express their 
outrage, they flooded select Estonian websites with internet packets, exploiting at least 
one “botnet” of compromised computers to create a massive amount of traffic. Their 
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack shut down the sites until the Estonians could 
effectively block the traffic and the hackers backed off. Russian hackers launched similar 
attacks against Georgian websites in 2008, this time in conjunction with a military 
confrontation between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia. 
 
Not all information-related conflicts center on cyber attacks. Following the 2009 
presidential election in Iran, for example, protestors used various cyber media including 
Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and text messaging to distribute information and videos 
about the protests. In response, the Iranian government took steps to block access to 
certain websites and media. The government’s efforts were only partially effective, 
however, as Iranians shared information and tools for circumventing the censors. Some of 
the protestors also launched a DDoS attack against President Ahmadinejad’s website, but 
this was short-lived and played a minor role in the overall conflict. 
  
This paper examines the global flow of information in terms of a power struggle between 
efforts to cause flows and efforts to block them. It analyzes the nature of this power, how 
it is exercised, and the objectives served. Although a variety of information media are 
considered, emphasis is placed on flows enabled by computer networks, including the 
internet and mobile phone networks. Whereas information flows were at one time 
dominated by human interactions within small localities, today they are facilitated by 
global networks of hardware and software systems. The software itself is data, allowing it 
to flow like other information. But unlike other forms of information, which are 
effectively inert, software causes things to happen, including information flows. Spyware, 
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for example, captures data on one computer and transmits it to another; computer worms 
spread their damaging code to other vulnerable hosts. 
 
In viewing the global flow of information as a power struggle, the paper does not mean to 
imply a lack of cooperation and collaboration in the information environment. Indeed, 
people frequently cooperate to share information and promote flows, as well as to stop 
them. The world’s largest encyclopedia, Wikipedia, is the product of widespread 
collaboration on the internet. But even there, conflicts are common over specific content, 
as users edit and delete material to serve their interests. 
 
After examining the power of flow and the power of blockage, the paper looks at the 
characteristics and challenges of flows that are covert in nature. It then examines how 
laws and regulations support blockage power and, to a lesser extent, flow power. With 
this background, the paper considers the issue of information control, and whether this is 
even possible. Finally, it turns to the question of what power over information flow 
means in terms of influence. Ultimately, it is not the ability to control flows that matter as 




Information flows arise when information is transmitted from a source (or sender) to a 
destination (or receiver) over some channel. The source can be a human; a device such as 
a computer, sensor, or broadcast station; or some combination, as when a user sends an e-
mail message from a laptop or places a call from a mobile phone. Similarly, the 
destination can be a human, device, or both. The information channel may be provided or 
mediated by third parties, including communication service providers and governments. 
Further, the channel itself may be the source or target of additional flows, as when it is 
wiretapped. 
 
Flow power is the ability to cause a flow of particular information from a given source to 
a given destination within a specified time. Time is an important element, because 
information can become stale and irrelevant. 
 
Flow power can reside at the source, destination, or channel. At the source, power is 
characterized by an ability to push information to the destination. The means vary and 
include sending an e-mail, text, or instant message; talking in person or on the phone; 
transmitting a fax; broadcasting a television or radio program; and uploading information 
to a website or file directory.   
 
Power at the destination is characterized by an ability to pull information from the source. 
A principal means is downloading information from a website or file server. 
 
Many, perhaps most, information flows result from a combination of push and pull. 
Radio and television broadcasters push their programming onto the airwaves; viewers 
pull the ones they desire by tuning their receivers to the specified channels. Owners of 
websites push information onto their sites; interested users visit the sites and pull the 
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information they want; they may also push new information onto the site by filling in a 
form or adding comments to a discussion thread. Even e-mail, which is predominantly a 
form of push, requires some pull from the recipient, namely to select, open, and read a 
message in the inbox. The result is that flow power may be shared by senders and 
receivers, with neither party being in full control of the flow. Still, the balance of power 
may not be even. E-mail and postal mail seem to favor senders, as illustrated by junk 
mail. 
 
In some cases, the sender or receiver can execute a flow without help from the other 
party, or at least a human party. For example, pop-up ads are essentially pushed onto a 
user’s computer, although facilitated by software running on the user’s machine. Fax is 
another example which puts virtually all of the power in the hands of the sender. As an 
example where the receiver of information has the power, consider a hacker who breaks 
into another computer system. The hacker can pull information from the compromised 
machine without the owner’s cooperation or consent, assisted only by software on the 
computer (possibly even pushed there by the hacker). 
 
Third parties who provide or control the information channels also have power over 
information flows. These include internet service providers, and the owners and operators 
of network routers and name servers. E-mail and web traffic cannot flow without this 
basic infrastructure. In addition, much of what people access on the web is mediated 
through search engines, which control the order of entries in “hit” lists and which sites on 
the web are indexed. The authors of blogs and other types of web pages also facilitate 
flows by linking to other pages. 
 
Receivers of information can serve as intermediaries for additional flows by forwarding 
the information to others, thereby facilitating flows from the originating source to 
downstream recipients. Indeed, information often flows through social networks via e-
mail and other channels, reaching people not even known to the originator. In the 
process, intermediaries serve as brokers or gatekeepers to further flows. 
 
In general, flow power is increasing across the board. One reason is that the volume of 
information is increasing, so there is considerably more information to push and pull. But 
technology has played an even larger role, reducing human effort at both the sending and 
receiving ends, and reducing transmission times and costs. Software performs many tasks 
that once required considerable human effort, such as sending mass mailings and regular 
news updates, and managing distribution lists. Today’s messaging environment has made 
it virtually effortless to send new and forwarded information across the globe in 
practically no time and at practically no cost. The web, together with powerful search 
engines that comb it, has become an enormous library and marketplace, empowering 
those who want to find and acquire information as well as those who want to publish and 
disseminate it. The benefits are enormous, but they are partially offset by numerous 







Blockage power is the ability to prevent particular information from flowing from a given 
source to a given destination. It is the opposite of flow power and serves to undermine it 
by denying, degrading, and disrupting information flow.  
 
As a rule, blockage power is selective. The goal is not to prevent all information flow, 
only those that deemed harmful. Blockage power is directed at a range of information, 
including spam; malicious software such as computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and 
spyware; sensitive information sought by spies; intellectual property transmitted in 
violation of copyrights; information contraband such as child pornography; and 
information censored by governments. 
 
Like flow power, blockage power can be exercised at the source or destination, or by 
third parties along the way. At the source, it takes the form of security measures, 
including access controls, filters, encryption, and digital rights management. Access 
controls deny unauthorized persons the ability to transmit information from the source. 
They typically depend on a system of user identification and authentication, such as user 
names and passwords. However, they can be based on other factors such as location. 
Jihadist websites, for example, have been known to prohibit access to visitors from 
certain countries. Filters, including firewalls and anti-viral tools, serve to block certain 
information from leaving the source, including packets and messages with malicious 
code. Encryption protects data both in storage and in transit. Even if the bits flow, the 
information conveyed by them will be inaccessible to those without the key or the means 
to crack the code. Digital rights management (DRM) uses a combination of access 
control and encryption to protect intellectual property from flowing in ways that violate a 
licensing agreement. 
 
Security is also essential to block flows at the receiving end. Access controls deny 
unauthorized persons the ability to deposit information at the destination. Filters block 
incoming information deemed harmful, including packets associated with computer 
intrusions. They stop malicious software and spam that arrives via messaging systems or 
web browsing.  
 
Intermediaries also have the power to block flows. Infrastructure operators can filter out 
spam, malicious code, and information that violates policies and laws. Web hosting 
services in the United States and elsewhere have taken down thousands of websites 
containing child pornography, pirated software and music, and scams. They have also 
removed jihadist websites supporting terrorists. In China, where information is heavily 
censored, internet service providers are required to filter out and remove banned 
information. Information entering the country is filtered at border routers implementing 
China’s “great firewall.” 
 
Third parties can block flows even if they do not own or control the infrastructure. For 
example, they can keep information from flowing in or out of a website by bombarding 
the server with worthless traffic, as was done with the Estonian and Georgian cyber 
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attacks. Even if the channels are not fully blocked, these denial-of-service attacks can 
substantially degrade legitimate flows. Such attacks have driven some e-commerce sites 
and internet service providers out of business, because they could not sustain the losses. 
Others have given in to extortionists, paying perpetrators to stop their attacks.  
 
Unscrupulous businesses have also engaged in “click fraud” in order to get their 
competitor’s click-through ads off the internet. For example, by repetitively clicking on 
prepaid ads that are limited to so many clicks, they can drive the clicks up to the limit, 
whereupon the ads are removed.  
 
Just as information technology has increased flow power, it has increased the power to 
block those flows. Information security and content filtering tools, for example, continue 
to improve, making it possible to block traffic that at one time flowed freely. As bad as 
spam is, at least it is amenable to blockage, whereas postal junk mail is not. However, 
considering the rate of increase in information flow, it is not clear that advances in 
blockage power have kept up with flow power. Part of the reason is that improvements in 
blockage motivate those who wish to move information to find new ways of doing so. 
Often, the new methods are covert and distributed, making them much harder to observe 




Covert power is a form of flow power where the information flow is hidden. The 
objective is to conceal the source, destination, or content from an adversary who might 
observe or obstruct the flow.  
 
A wiretap or other type of hidden communication intercept is an example of a covert flow 
where a copy of the intercepted message stream flows secretly to a hidden receiver. 
However, although the communicants may not know their messages are being read or 
heard, they can effectively block the covert flow by encrypting their communications, as 
noted earlier. 
 
Most computer attacks involve covert flows. Hackers, for example, secretly plant 
malicious software, including spyware and hacking tools, on vulnerable machines. The 
software allows the hackers to secretly exfiltrate sensitive information from the systems. 
In addition, the compromised machines may be employed in botnets that send out spam 
and launch DDoS attacks, all without their owners knowing. Likewise, computer viruses 
and worms spread secretly from one machine to another without the owners even 
realizing that their machines have been infected.  
 
Some covert flows circumvent security controls at a destination by pretending to come 
from a trusted source. Packets get through firewalls with fake IP source addresses, and 
malicious e-mail arrives with spoofed headers. Users unwittingly open e-mail 
attachments and click on links to malicious websites thinking the e-mail came from their 
bank or other trusted party. In a typical “phishing” scenario, the user is duped into typing 
in personal information such as a username and password or social security number.  
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Initiators of flows can also hijack channels in order to take over a network connection or 
broadcast medium. Israel, for example, hijacked live broadcasts from Hezballah’s Al-
Manar television station in order to supplant the station’s regular programming with its 
own messages. 
 
In some cases, the source and destination of a flow collaborate in order to hide a flow 
from third parties such as wiretappers. An example is the use of steganography, which 
attempts to hide the transmission of information. By hiding the message within a cover 
medium such as an image or video, the communicants can conceal the flow of the 
message from third party observers. However, a third party may observe the flow of the 
cover message and thereby learn that at least something is being communicated. 
Encryption is similar, but in this case the message is hidden by scrambling the bits rather 
than trying to conceal its transmission. 
 
Third parties can facilitate covert flows. Proxy servers, for example, allow users to 
browse the web while concealing their IP address from a visited website, and the 
website’s IP address from intermediaries (e.g., governments) watching what flows in and 
out of the user’s computer. They provide one means whereby users in China, Iran, and 
other countries that censor the Internet can get around the filters that prohibit access to 
certain foreign sites. Banned information can also slip past the filters of these countries 
through the use of encryption and steganography. Software tools have been developed to 
explicitly support these covert flows. 
 
Laws and Regulations 
 
The preceding discussion illustrates how technology enhances both the power of 
information flow and the power of blockage. This power is also strengthened through 
laws and regulations. Those that support the rights of free expression and access to 
information strengthen the power of flow, while those that restrict those rights strengthen 
the power of blockage. 
 
Most if not all governments have regulatory authority over their information 
environment. Authoritarian governments generally restrict more information than 
democracies, but even democracies prohibit certain types of information such as child 
pornography, defamatory speech, fraudulent advertising, and speech that incites violence. 
In addition, governments have laws protecting classified information from disclosure and 
intellectual property from piracy and theft. When these laws and regulations are broken, 
infrastructure owners are entitled to block offending information flows. They can take 
down websites or remove files from them, block broadcasts and individual messages, and 
deny access to perpetrators. At the same time, free speech laws ensure that public 
providers cannot block information flows just because they find them offensive. In 
addition, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and corporate disclosure laws ensure 
that government agencies and corporations release certain information even when they 
would prefer to withhold it. 
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Regulations do not provide absolute power over information flows, as laws can be 
violated and information can flow covertly. Further, enforcement across borders can be 
difficult. Information prohibited in one country may not be in another, and monitoring 
information flows over borders is difficult at best. Citizens of a country where 
information is prohibited may be able to acquire it from foreign sources by covert means, 
as noted earlier.  
 
Still, laws and regulations matter. Most internet service providers in China abide by the 
regulations to censor, lest they risk heavy penalties or closure. This is equally true of 
western companies operating within China, leading to criticisms of Google, Cisco, and 
others for supporting the censors instead of demanding free speech. In addition, most 
Chinese accept the legal regime and self-censor. Relatively few flagrantly violate the law, 
and many that do end up in prison.  
 
Although intellectual property laws have certainly not prevented the flow of software, 
music, and other files in violation of copyrights, they have arguably reduced their flow. 
Lawsuits against businesses found to have unlicensed software motivated companies to 
make sure the software on their computers was licensed. Similarly, those against Napster 
and other services that promoted unfettered music sharing led to the launch of new 
services that better support the protection of intellectual property, while enabling its flow. 
Had these and lawsuits against individual violators not been filed, copyrights might be 




Control over the information environment is usually regarded as the ability to prevent 
certain flows, including downstream flows following the limited release of information. 
The general consensus is that these flows cannot be controlled. Once information is out 
there, especially on the internet, it cannot be retracted or restricted to particular parties. It 
can go anywhere, assisted by covert means or even overtly. Moreover, anything can be 
put on the internet, in defiance of government and corporate censors. 
 
This paper takes the view that the issue of control is more nuanced. Although the ability 
to block flows is never complete, steps can be taken to considerably reduce the likelihood 
or extent of particular flows. These steps can draw upon both technology and the law. In 
China, the information environment is strongly affected by laws and regulations 
governing users and service providers, by the products that block and filter flows at the 
border routers and internally, by the thousands of cybercops who enforce the laws, and by 
the severe penalties imposed on violators. Chinese users can circumvent the filters using 
encryption and steganography, but most do not bother. 
 
Information placed on the internet may seem impossible to take back, yet it happens all 
the time. News sites remove stories from public view, organizations pull documents, and 
entire websites disappear. In some cases, the information may still be on the net, but 
hidden on a page that is password controlled or not seen by search engines. Unless the 
information has been copied to a public website that is scanned and indexed by major 
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search engines, it will be as good as gone, as far as most users concerned. That the 
information may exist somewhere will be of little value. The internet archive 
(www.archive.org) is an ambitious attempt to keep a record of information posted on the 
internet, but it is far from complete, and information has been removed from there as 
well. 
 
Still, there are many situations where people lose control over their information. Internet 
users give their personal information to a website, only to learn that it has been 
compromised by hackers or sold to a third party. They find out that sensitive information 
sent in a private e-mail was forwarded to others or posted on a website. They discover 
that their search queries are logged and potentially available to the government. They find 
out that a software product installed on their computer has hidden spyware, which has 
been sending information from their machine to the vendor’s. Government officials post 
redacted documents on their websites, only to learn that the “deleted” information was 
inadvertently exposed and published on a site outside government control. Information 
security mechanisms protect against some of these flows, but not all.  
  
In general, it is easier to control information the closer it is to the source. If the photos 
taken at Abu Ghraib had never been taken or entered the public domain, where they 
quickly spread around the world, the impact would have been far less. Better still, had the 
prisoners never been abused, there would have been no story of mistreatment to report in 
the first place. Even if we cannot completely control the downstream flow of information, 
we can control our actions, which in turn affect the information generated about us and 
disseminated to other parties. However, we are still not in complete control, as people can 
concoct and propagate conspiracy stories and other falsehoods. These stories will co-exist 
with accurate ones in a sea of information where perception can matter more than truth.  
 
Overall, governments have greater control over the information environment than other 
entities, because of their ability to censor information within their borders under national 
laws, however limited that power may be. But organizations are not powerless, as they 
can fire their own personnel for accessing or posting inappropriate information, and they 
can sue those who steal their intellectual property. 
 
In addition to blocking information, governments and other entities can attempt to shape 
the information environment through information flows. They can flood the information 
environment with carefully crafted messages, submit stories to the press faster than their 
opponents, and post messages on venues that draw large audiences. Indeed, it may be 
more effective to post information on a popular website than on one that is rarely visited 
but under the publisher’s control. Chinese authorities, operating undercover, reportedly 
post commentaries defending the government on Internet discussion sites to counter 
negative comments on those sites, finding this to be more effective than posting to 








Ultimately, one’s goal may go beyond simply causing or blocking flows, or even 
controlling the information environment. It may be influencing the opinions, decisions 
and actions of target audiences. Governments are interested in promoting their national 
and international agendas; political parties seek votes for their candidates; and businesses 
want consumers to buy their products. 
 
For information to influence people, it must first reach them. This can be easier said than 
done. Simply publishing information on a website or broadcasting it over the airwaves 
does not guarantee it will get to a target audience. The audience may never visit the site 
or tune their stations to the desired programs. As noted above, posting information to 
already popular websites and other media can help. In the Arab world, one can reach a 
much larger audience through al-Jazeera than CNN. 
 
Sending information directly via e-mail or other messaging systems is also problematic, 
as the messages may be viewed as spam and discarded. These systems generally work 
best when the receivers knows the senders and are favorably disposed toward them or 
have asked for information from them, for example, by subscribing to an e-mail 
newsletter or following someone on Twitter. Another strategy is to relay the message 
through a trusted relationship; instead of contacting the target directly, the message is 
sent to a trusted friend or colleague of the target. Internet services such as LinkedIn give 
users the ability to construct, manage, and use trust networks to reach people they do not 
otherwise know. 
 
Assuming a message has reached its target, how the target responds will be a function of 
the message’s perceived credibility; the target’s psychology, past experiences, social 
communities, and culture; the target’s relationship to and views of the source of the 
information; and the context in which the message is received. A message that appeals to 
a government’s own citizens might be found repugnant to a foreign audience. 
 
The ability to influence another party can be based on different types of power 
relationships. John French and Bertram Raven identified five in their seminal paper “The 
Bases of Social Power” (Studies in Social Power, 1959): reward, coercive, legitimate, 
expert, and referent. 
 
With reward power, influence is achieved by mediating rewards to the target of influence, 
where the granting of rewards is contingent on the target taking a desired action (or 
inaction). Con artists exploit reward power by promising benefits that are never 
delivered. With the Nigerian 409 scams, victims believe they will receive millions of 
dollars after putting up a few thousand; instead, they find they are duped. Enough people 
fall for such scams that a considerable portion of the global e-mail traffic contains 
fraudulent messages. 
 
With coercive power, influence is achieved through threats or acts of punishment.   
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By serving lawsuits against file sharing services that facilitated music sharing in violation 
of copyrights, the music industry influenced the development and deployment of products 
and services that support copyrights. Extortionists have also used coercive power, 
threatening to disclose secrets acquired by hacking or to launch a DDoS attack against a 
critical website unless the victim pays. 
 
Legitimate power refers to the power that comes from the authority vested in roles and 
social norms. The target of influence accepts that the source has the authority to prescribe 
certain actions. As noted earlier, most Internet users in China accept the rulings by their 
government about posting certain types of information on the Internet. Similarly, 
employees accept certain restrictions imposed by their organizations on internet use. In 
many cases such as these, the legitimate power is also backed up with coercive power, for 
example, the threat of being fined, imprisoned, or fired.  
 
With expert power, one’s influence on another party is based on knowledge and expertise 
that has value to the other party. The information supplied by experts is generally more 
likely to receive widespread distribution and be acted upon by recipients than information 
from non-experts. 
 
Referent power is one of the strongest forms of social power. It is based on a feeling of 
attraction to and identification with the influencer. The target of referent power will take 
actions to please, imitate, or support the source, for example, by buying a product or 
donating to a charity promoted by a celebrity. The source may not even be aware of the 
power held over the target. Referent power is similar to the soft power described by 
Joseph Nye in his book by that title. Like the other forms of social power, people with 
referent power have an advantage when it comes to reaching and influencing others. 
 
Intermediaries also play a role in influence. Consumers consult product ratings and 
reviews before making purchasing decisions; voters talk with family and friends before 
filling in their ballots; and government leaders examine intelligence reports before 
making certain decisions. In some cases, the value of intermediaries can be subverted. 
For example, book authors can improve their ratings on Amazon.com by supplying 
anonymous five-star reviews of their own books. Similarly, they can lower the ratings of 
competing books by supplying anonymous one-star reviews of those books. By 




The global flow of information is competitive, with the power of flow frequently 
bumping up against the power of blockage. While no player has complete control over 
the information environment, each has limited power to cause or support certain flows 
and block others. However, there is a constant tension between the power of flow and the 
power of blockage. Channels that seem to be blocked may be circumvented through 
covert flows; yet, at the same time, flows that seem impossible to block technically may 
be sharply reduced through laws and regulations. 
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The competition between flow power and blockage power is manifest in both domestic 
and international conflicts. In addition, it has given rise to several information-related 
conflicts, including the free flow of intellectual property vs. copyright protection, free 
speech vs. government censorship, spam vs. e-mail control, hacking and malicious 
software vs. security and privacy, and government and corporate surveillance vs. privacy. 
None of these have or are likely to have clear winners and losers, as technology 
continually advances to support new means of flow and new means of blockage. At the 
same time, the legal environment adapts to better empower certain actors. 
 
In at least some of these conflicts, the ultimate question is not who wins the flow wars, 
but who wins at influence. Which companies succeed in the market? Which governments 
realize their policy agendas? Do individuals retain their civil liberties? Still, the global 
flow of information plays a critical role in determining influence, and is fundamental to 
it. As long as there are competing agendas, there will be power struggles over the 
information environment. 
 
 
